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Introduction 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has an important 
and well-defined mission with broad public support. Too often, 
however, the Agency has sought to strengthen its position by aligning 
itself with politically powerful rent-seeking interests. There are 
numerous examples—most recently, the use of the renewable fuels 
standards to subsidize ethanol refiners and related agricultural 
interests. My wish for the Agency on its fiftieth birthday is that it stays 
focused on its own mission and remembers that old adage: “Dilution is 
not the solution to pollution.” 
I. Agencies Come and Agencies Go 
My first full-time job was as an operations research analyst at the 
EPA in 1977, under President Jimmy Carter and Administrator Doug 
Costle. I returned to serve as the EPA’s Associate Administrator for 
Policy, Economics, and Innovation from 2005 to 2009, under President 
George W. Bush and Administrator Steve Johnson. 
In between those stints, I held several other jobs that let me see the 
EPA from different perspectives: from 1979 to 1987 I did economic 
 
†  Brian Mannix is a research professor at The George Washington 
University Regulatory Studies Center. He was an operations research 
analyst at the EPA in 1977–1978. From 1996–1998 he served as the 
Commonwealth of Virginia’s Deputy Secretary of Natural Resources. And 
from 2005–2009 he served as the EPA’s Associate Administrator for 
Policy, Economics, and Innovation. 
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oversight of EPA regulations first at the Council on Wage & Price 
Stability and then at the newly created Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
Later, I held a position in state government, supervising the state’s 
Department of Environmental Quality and its interactions with the 
EPA. For a while I worked at a manufacturing think tank, and learned 
the challenges of regulatory compliance from its members. 
Along the way I often found reasons to question the Agency’s 
decisions, but to this day, the EPA remains my favorite federal agency. 
In part that is because I have many friends and colleagues there, but it 
is also because, in contrast to many other federal agencies, the EPA has 
a persuasive reason to exist. 
That may sound odd, but when I first studied public policy in the 
1970s, it was common to ask whether a government program was really 
necessary, and sometimes the answer was “no.” President Carter 
promoted a concept called “zero-based budgeting,” which encouraged a 
fundamental review of each program every year.1 (Sadly, it did not last.) 
In 1974, under Chairman Ted Kennedy, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee held hearings questioning the need for airline regulation by 
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).2 The hearings were organized by 
Special Counsel (now Justice) Stephen Breyer, from whom I took an 
administrative law course when he returned to the academy.3 Economist 
Alfred Kahn was the star witness at those hearings; he went on to chair 
the CAB and to help phase it out of existence.4 This year we celebrate 
the thirty-fifth anniversary of the CAB’s abolition. 
This year we also celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the trucking 
and rail deregulation bills signed by President Carter, and the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the complete demise of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC). In fact, the ICC’s old hearing room still exists; it is 
now a conference room called Room 1123 EPA East. After a difficult 
day in the office, I would sometimes go to that room just to rejoice in 
the fact that the ICC was no longer there. We rightly celebrate the 
dismantling of those agencies in the era of economic deregulation,5 
 
1. Charlie B. Tyer, Zero-Base Budgeting: A Critical Analysis, 1 S. Rev. 
Pub. Admin. 88, 88–90 (1977). 
2. Edward M. Kennedy, Airline Regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board, 
41 J. Air L. & Com. 607, 607 (1975). 
3. See Stephen Breyer’s Path to the Supreme Court, Nat’l Const. Ctr.: 
Const. Daily (Aug. 3, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/stephen-
breyers-path-to-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/FB3V-MSU2]. 
4. See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Alfred E. Kahn Dies at 93; Prime Mover of 
Airline Deregulation, N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 2010), https://nytimes.com/ 
 2010/12/29/business/29kahn.html [https://perma.cc/6QHK-ADKW]. 
5. See William A. Niskanen, Economic Deregulation in the United States: 
Lessons for America, Lessons for China, 8 Cato J. 657, 657 (1989) 
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which was a thoroughly bipartisan effort and was a spectacular success 
in terms of improving consumer welfare. 
At roughly the same time, new agencies were being created to 
address environmental, health, and safety concerns. And new 
procedures were put in place to guide these social regulatory agencies. 
President Clinton’s Executive Order No. 12,866,6 Regulatory Planning 
and Review, built on earlier efforts by Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, 
and Reagan, and remains in effect today.7 It specifies that, before 
regulating, agencies should state what problem they are trying to solve, 
explain why markets are not adequate to solve it, examine the available 
alternatives, and use cost–benefit analysis to evaluate the alternatives’ 
relative merits.8 
Applied rigorously, the well-established principles in Clinton’s 
executive order might give some agencies considerable trouble. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration might struggle to 
explain why labor markets and traditional common law remedies would 
not adequately ensure workplace safety, for example. The Consumer 
Product Safety Commission would need to explain how its regulations 
improve the function of markets for consumer goods. Where exactly is 
the market failure? 
But the EPA would have no such trouble explaining why it is 
needed. Environmental externalities are a very real problem, and 
markets do not exist to handle them adequately. The need for the EPA 
is not really in question. 
This is not to say we could not find radical ways to improve the 
way the EPA approaches its job. There are plenty of opportunities to 
strengthen property rights and private remedies for environmental 
damage, and to design more market-like regulatory solutions. From the 
beginning, the EPA has done some thoughtful work on this topic, but 
in its regulatory actions, the impulse to command and control more 
often seems to prevail. 
We could also do a better job of parsing the federal and state roles 
in environmental protection. Contrary to much of the press coverage, I 
think the recent rule narrowing the definition of “waters of the United 
States” is a step in the right direction.9 States have been protecting 
water quality for far longer than fifty years, and in many ways they are 
 
(noting that during the 1980s, the federal government generally reduced 
regulation). 
6. 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).  
7. See Robert J. Duffy, Regulatory Oversight in the Clinton Administration, 
27 Presidential Stud. Q. 71, 73, 75 (1997). 
8. See id. at 74–75. 
9. See The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the 
United States”, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,251 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, & 401). 
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better equipped to carry out this task. They have the authority to 
regulate land use, for example, which can be one of the most important 
tools for protecting water quality. 
But in the final analysis, we will still need a federal agency with 
responsibility for environmental regulation. The EPA gets its fair share 
of criticism, but still enjoys strong bipartisan support and unwavering 
public support.10 It therefore should have the confidence to put up a 
vigorous resistance when rent-seeking interests seek to bend the 
Agency’s authorities towards private aims that often conflict with the 
public interest. 
II. Of Bootleggers and Baptists 
Clemson Professor Bruce Yandle offered a positive theory of social 
regulation based on an analogy to the tacit alliance of bootleggers and 
Baptists, both of whom, for different reasons, supported alcohol 
prohibition11: 
Durable social regulation evolves when it is demanded by both of 
two distinctly different groups. “Baptists” point to the moral high 
ground and give vital and vocal endorsement of laudable public 
benefits . . . . “Bootleggers” are much less visible but no less vital. 
Bootleggers, who expect to profit from the very regulatory 
restrictions desired by Baptists, grease the political machinery 
with some of their expected proceeds. They are simply in it for 
the money.12  
Viewed through this lens, my argument above could be restated as 
follows: In contrast to the economic regulatory agencies, the EPA has 
a strong “Baptist” case for its existence. Agencies like the CAB and the 
ICC were overrun with bootleggers, typically explained by some variant 
of “agency capture” theories;13 but their Baptist stories were lacking. 
Their stated mission was to protect consumers from the high prices that 
would otherwise prevail because of natural monopolies.14 As the 
Kennedy–Breyer hearings vividly demonstrated, in practice those 
agencies were harming consumers by protecting monopolies—exactly 
 
10. See How the EPA Became a Victim of Its Own Success, NPR (Feb. 17, 
2017), https://npr.org/2017/02/17/515748401/how-the-epa-became-a-victim-
of-its-own-success [https://perma.cc/F4ER-3S7R]. 
11. Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, 22 Regulation 5, 
5 (1999).  
12. Id. 
13. See id. at 7. 
14. William A. Jordan, Producer Protection: Prior Market Structure and the 
Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. & Econ. 151, 151–52 (1972). 
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the opposite of their stated missions. Thus exposed, the bootleggers 
were run out of town during the era of economic deregulation.15 
With its strong Baptist mission, the EPA is in no danger of being 
run out of town, but it does need to be on guard against bootleggers 
who seek to exploit the Agency. In this, it has not always been 
successful. 
A. “Clean Coal, Dirty Air” 
The first example was well documented by Bruce Ackerman and 
William Hassler in Clean Coal, Dirty Air.16 In the 1970s, federal 
regulation of air quality threatened to put eastern high-sulfur coal at 
an economic disadvantage compared to western low-sulfur coal.17 To 
prevent this outcome, eastern coal interests fought to shape both the 
Clean Air Act and the EPA’s interpretation of it.18 Rather than a 
performance standard for sulfur emissions, the EPA required scrubbers. 
These worked, but they imposed on the public both higher costs for 
electricity and lower air quality than might otherwise have been 
achieved.19 
It was also during this first decade that the EPA began to 
“grandfather in” older electric power plants, effectively creating a 
privileged special interest that would present the Agency with many 
challenges over the years.20 Agency analysts knew at the time that 
alternatives were available: emissions trading systems, like those later 
adopted in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, would make it 
possible to adopt aggressive pollution-reduction goals without having 
to carve out exceptions.21 But the model that prevailed at the EPA was 
a bootlegger-and-Baptist model: command-and-control regulation with 
selectively granted indulgences. 
 
15. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of 
Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1366–68 (1998). 
16. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean 
Coal/Dirty Air (1981). 
17. See id. at 17–19. 
18. See id. at 18. 
19. See id. at 12–34. 
20. Richard Revesz et al., Grandfathering Coal: Power Plant Regulation 
Under the Clean Air Act, 46 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10,541, 
10,541 (2016). 
21. Richard E. Ayres, The 1990 Clean Air Amendments: Performance and 
Prospects, 13 Nat. Resources & Env’t 379, 381 (1998). 
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B. The “Land Ban” of Hazardous Waste 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.22 Both 
the legislation and the EPA’s subsequent implementing regulations 
were strategically shaped by the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council 
(HWTC), a trade association that, to an economist, looked very much 
like a cartel.23 At the time, only a limited number of facilities were 
legally permitted to treat hazardous waste, and the HWTC worked 
hard to ensure that every other method of waste disposal—whether 
land disposal or incineration at sea—was outlawed.24 They insisted on 
technology-based rather than risk-based standards for treatment in 
order to protect their captive market from any innovator who might 
come up with a better means of disposal.25 The Council also insisted 
that used oil be classified as a hazardous waste, in order to prevent its 
beneficial recycling. The result of their efforts was severely limited 
capacity and very high prices for hazardous waste disposal—profitable 
for the members of the HWTC but harmful to consumers, and, very 
likely, the environment, due to all the illegal dumping of hazardous 
waste that the high prices encouraged.26 
C. Protecting the Ozone Layer, and a Manufacturer 
Pursuant to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, a treaty signed in 1987,27 the EPA has phased out various 
halogenated hydrocarbons, especially refrigerants.28 This phase-out 
proceeded in stages over many years as new refrigerants that were less 
 
22. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 
(2012). 
23. See Susan E. Dudley, Bootleggers & Baptists: The Experience of Another 
Regulatory Economist 5–6 (Nov. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center), available 
at https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/bootleggers-baptists-
experience-another-regulatory-economist [https://perma.cc/UV3M-25GJ].  
24. See id. at 6. 
25. Id.; William Boyes, Managerial Economics: Markets and the 
Firm 177 (2d ed. 2011). 
26. Dudley, supra note 23, at 6. 
27. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 26,369. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments gave 
the EPA the authority to issue regulations implementing this treaty. See 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4213 (2012)). 
28. Protection on Stratospheric Ozone: Update to the Refrigerant 
Management Requirements Under the Clean Air Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 82,272, 
82,275 (Nov. 18, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82). 
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harmful to the ozone layer were brought to market.29 The phase-out 
was coordinated globally, but mostly the EPA seems to have 
coordinated with the leading manufacturer of covered halogenated 
hydrocarbons, DuPont (now Chemours).30 Indeed, one striking feature 
of the phase-out is that older refrigerants seem to have been banned 
just when their patent protection was due to expire, and when a newly 
patented replacement chemical became available.31 The net result has 
been to restrict competition in the market for refrigerants, globally as 
well as domestically, resulting in sustained high prices. To be sure, the 
Montreal Protocol has been successful in halting and reversing damage 
to the ozone layer;32 but the manner in which it was done has been 
profitable for the manufacturer and very expensive for consumers. 
D. Picking the Perfect Pesticide 
The EPA’s registration (and re-registration) of pesticides resembles 
in many ways the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of new 
drugs, and in both cases the agencies feel pressure to use their health 
and safety authorities to erect barriers to competition. A manufacturer 
may argue, for example, that its proprietary formulation is superior to 
all competitors in a particular application, and that the agency should 
therefore ban the others. Even when the argument has merit, however, 
that approach tends to create government-protected monopolies, and 
can sacrifice the substantial advantages of competition and innovation. 
E. CAFE Standards 
The Department of Transportation has issued Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy standards since the 1970s but, after Massachusetts v. 
EPA was decided in 2007, the EPA has adopted a parallel program 
under the Clean Air Act to control greenhouse gases.33 In doing so, the 
EPA has adopted many of the bootlegger pathologies that have long 
 
29. See Office of Air & Radiation, EPA, EPA-430-R-07-001, 
Achievements in Stratospheric Ozone Protection 18–19 (2007). 
30. See Chuck Booten et al., Clean Energy Manufacturing Analysis 
Center, Refrigerants: Market Trends and Supply Chain 
Assessment 1, 24, 33, 39, 49 (2020); Sharon Lerner, How a Dupont 
Spinoff Lobbied the EPA to Stave Off the Use of Environmentally Friendly 
Coolants, Intercept (Aug. 25, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/08/ 
 25/chemours-epa-coolant-refrigerant-dupont/ [https://perma.cc/XQG3-
P2KE]. 
31. See Booten et al., supra note 30, at 19. 
32. See Stephen Leahy, Without the Ozone Treaty You’d Get Sunburned 
in 5 Minutes, Nat’l Geographic (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.national 
 geographic.com/news/2017/09/montreal-protocol-ozone-treaty-30-climate-
change-hcfs-hfcs.html [https://perma.cc/X2MC-W4BJ]. 
33. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,499–
500 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I). 
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plagued the CAFE program. Just as appliance manufacturers use the 
Department of Energy’s (DOE) appliance efficiency standards to 
exclude low-priced foreign competitors from the U.S. market, domestic 
auto manufacturers try to shape the CAFE standards in ways that 
provide a competitive advantage. The standards are tiered so that light 
trucks—broadly defined, and popular with American consumers—get a 
looser standard. And the EPA adopted the “footprint method” of 
calculating mileage—giving extra credit to cars with a long and wide 
wheelbase.34 There is no environmental or other public benefit 
associated with a large footprint; it is simply a way of creating a 
regulatory obstacle to imported vehicles that typically have smaller 
footprints. Much of the unfortunate squabbling over the CAFE 
standards has nothing to do with climate or any public benefit; instead 
it reflects the efforts of bootleggers to tilt to their own advantage the 
various cross-subsidies embedded in the details of the CAFE rules. 
F. Getting the Lead Out of Gasoline 
Beginning in 1973, the EPA set limits on the use of tetraethyl lead, 
an octane booster, in gasoline.35 There were two reasons for limiting 
lead use, and therefore two different requirements. The first reason was 
that the EPA was mandating catalytic converters on new cars; lead 
would poison those catalysts, so the EPA also mandated that gas 
stations carry unleaded gasoline.36 The second rationale was that lead 
emissions from automobiles were a direct health threat, so the EPA 
limited the quantity of lead additives used in leaded gasoline, and 
lowered those limits over time.37 
This “lead phase-down” was in many ways an ideal candidate for a 
system of emissions trading. There was no need to measure the level of 
emissions: refiners knew exactly how much lead they were adding to 
the gasoline, and every gram of lead that went into the gas tank would 
be emitted by the tailpipe. But the EPA instead chose the command-
and-control-with-exceptions approach. The Agency set a binding limit, 
 
34. Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks; Model Years 2008–
2011, 70 Fed. Reg. 51,414, 51,416, 51,418 (proposed Aug. 30, 2005) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, & 537). 
35. See Fact Sheet—A Brief History of Octane in Gasoline: From Lead to 
Ethanol, Envtl. & Energy Study Inst. (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www 
 .eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-a-brief-history-of-octane [https://perma.cc/ 
 Y2NY-M57N]. 
36. V.M. Thomas, The Elimination of Lead in Gasoline 20 Ann. Rev. 
Energy & Env’t 301, 312 (1995). 
37. Jack Lewis, Lead Poisoning: A Historical Perspective, EPA J., May 1985, 
at 15, available at https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/lead-poisoning-
historical-perspective.html [https://perma.cc/CU24-F6XF]. 
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measured in grams of lead per gallon of gasoline, for larger refiners.38 
But it made exceptions for several tiers of small refiners.39 The smallest 
could use more than five times as much lead as large refiners.40 
At the time, small refiners were among the most powerful lobbyists 
in Washington. Oil and oil products were subject to price and allocation 
regulations administered by the DOE, which adopted a “small refiner 
bias” that funneled billions of dollars’ worth of oil entitlements to the 
small refiners.41 
In one of his first acts as President, Ronald Reagan deregulated oil 
prices and thus ended DOE’s small refiner bias.42 At the same time, his 
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief requested that the EPA 
re-examine the lead phase-down regulations.43 It asked the Agency to 
evaluate the most recent health evidence to see what level of lead use 
could be justified;44 and it asked the Agency to apply that level 
uniformly to all gasoline producers, using emissions trading, rather than 
exceptions, to accommodate the varying needs of different refiners. 
Initially the EPA’s Air Office resisted both of these requests, but 
its Policy Office had long sought to adopt emissions trading, and this 
was a perfect opportunity to try it. In 1982, the Agency promulgated a 
new rule that kept the total amount of lead at the same level as the old 
lead phase-down rules, but with a uniform limit on all refiners, and 
 
38. Richard G. Newell & Kristian Rogers, Res. for the Future, The 
U.S. Experience with the Phasedown of Lead in Gasoline 3 (2003) 
(“Large refiners . . . were to produce a quarterly average of no more than 
0.8 grams per gallon (gpg) for the first year and 0.5 gpg the next two 
years.”). 
39. Id. (“small refiners . . . faced a scale of five different standards”). 
40. See id. (“the smallest refiners being permitted 2.65 gpg, and the largest 
of the small refiners being permitted 0.8 gpg”). 
41. Notices of January 1981 and Entitlements Adjustments, 49 Fed. Reg. 
27,410, 27,411 (July 3, 1984). 
42. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., President Abolishes Last Price Controls on U.S.-
Produced Oil, N.Y. Times (Jan. 29, 1981), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
 1981/01/29/us/president-abolishes-last-price-controls-on-us-produced-oil.html 
[https://perma.cc/7XFX-JSCZ]. 
43. Herbert L. Needleman, The Removal of Lead from Gasoline: Historical 
and Personal Reflections, in 2 Public Health: The Development of 
a Discipline 181, 200–01 (Dona Schneider & David E. Lilienfeld eds., 
2011). 
44. See William Greider, When Big Business Needs a Favor, George Bush 
Gets the Call, Rolling Stone (Apr. 12, 1984, 12:00 PM), https://www 
 .rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/when-big-business-needs-a-favor-
george-bush-gets-the-call-240823/ [https://perma.cc/3P9G-CPK4]. Some 
refiners, most notably Arco, had argued that no limits were needed. Arco 
changed its position when it realized that a subsidiary, Arco Chemical, 
was the leading producer of feedstocks for octane boosters that would 
substitute for lead. 
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trading to give flexibility.45 The small refiners sued, arguing that 
emissions trading would never work.46 By the time they got to court, 
however, it was already working smoothly. Refiners could buy as many 
lead rights as they needed, at a price of about one cent per gram.47 
The result of this reform was striking. In the next three years, more 
than half of all refiners in the United States closed. The small refiners 
had served no real economic purpose, they existed only to collect the 
subsidies provided by the DOE and the EPA. 
There is another chapter to this story. On his own initiative, Joel 
Schwartz (then in the EPA’s Policy Office; now at Harvard’s School of 
Public Health) completed the study of the health effects of lead in 
gasoline that the OMB had requested. Following a briefing on the 
study, the OMB asked the EPA to propose the complete removal of 
lead from gasoline, which it did in 1984.48 At this point there was almost 
no resistance to the proposal because lead was no longer being used to 
subsidize small refiners. The lesson is that regulation to protect the 
environment is much easier to accomplish when it is not entangled with 
the private interests of bootleggers. 
The rest of the world followed the U.S. initiative; the Persian Gulf 
oil producers deserve special credit for facilitating the removal of leaded 
gasoline from the continents of Africa and Asia.49 The United Nations 
Environment Program has estimated the global health benefits of lead 
removal at nearly $2.4 trillion per year.50 
G. The Ethanol Bootleggers 
The EPA’s Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) mandates certain 
ratios of renewable fuels to fossil fuels used in motor vehicles.51 This 
 
45. EPA Sets New Limits on Lead in Gasoline, EPA, https://archive.epa.gov/ 
 epa/aboutepa/epa-sets-new-limits-lead-gasoline.html [https://perma.cc/ 
 XWU3-KSDX] (last updated Sept. 16, 2016). 
46. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 511, 
534 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
47. Id. at 536 & n.85. 
48. Kenneth Bridbord & David Hanson, A Personal Perspective on the Initial 
Federal Health-Based Regulation to Remove Lead from Gasoline, 117 
Envtl. Health Persp. 1195, 1199–2000 (2009). 
49. See Marc Lacey, Belatedly, Africa Is Converting to Lead-Free Gasoline, 
N.Y. Times (Oct. 31, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/31/world/ 
 africa/belatedly-africa-is-converting-to-leadfree-gasoline.html [https:// 
 perma.cc/VT7W-CQDZ]. 
50. Phase-Out of Leaded Petrol Brings Huge Health and Cost Benefits—UN-
Backed Study, U.N.: News (Oct. 27, 2011), https://news.un.org/en/ 
 story/2011/10/393292-phase-out-leaded-petrol-brings-huge-health-and-cost-
benefits-un-backed-study [https://perma.cc/H8AV-48QZ].  
51. Overview for Renewable Fuel Standard, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ 
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type of ratio constraint can be thought of as having two shadow prices: 
it creates a cross-subsidy by taxing the denominator and subsidizing 
the numerator. Thus the RFS effectively taxes gasoline and diesel fuel, 
and subsidizes ethanol and biodiesel. This mechanism is not itself 
objectionable; the lead-trading program described above also functioned 
through a ratio constraint; and, like the lead program, the RFS program 
allows for trading. The problem is that the case for renewable fuels, 
especially ethanol, is largely a bootlegger case. The promotion of 
ethanol fuel has been expensive, harmful to air and water quality, and 
of no discernable benefit to the climate. In recent years, it has been the 
Agriculture Department, more than the EPA, that has been advocating 
for aggressive RFS standards. 
The cost of the RFS is passed through to consumers in the price of 
fuels, but that has not stopped some oil refiners from requesting relief.52 
The EPA began granting exemptions from the RFS to refiners who 
argued that they could not afford to buy allowances (known as RINs) 
in the market.53 Given the history of the lead phase-down program 
above, it is dismaying to see how the RFS program has evolved. The 
EPA soon learned that the refiners who were granted exemptions then 
turned around and shorted the RIN market, based on the insider 
information that their own exemption was going to drive future RIN 
prices lower. 
The Agency has started to make the granting of RFS exemptions 
public in order to avoid this insider trading in the RIN market. Even 
so, the effect of the exemptions is to create yet another class of 
bootleggers. Consumers are still paying needlessly high prices for fuel, 
while ethanol refiners and select oil refiners are squabbling over how 
the spoils should be divided. Any environmental benefit in all this is 
difficult to find. 
Conclusion: Is the EPA a Victim or a Perpetrator? 
The examples above are necessarily very abbreviated accounts of 
what are much more complicated stories.54 I chose them just to 
illustrate the frequency with which bootleggers attempt to commandeer 
 
 renewable-fuel-standard-program/overview-renewable-fuel-standard [https:// 
 perma.cc/QZP9-P6BF] (last updated June 7, 2017). 
52. See Scott Irwin, Clearing the Logjam on the RFS and SREs: A Simple 
Proposal, farmdoc daily, Sept. 19, 2019, at 4, available at 
https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2019/09/clearing-the-logjam-on-the-rfs-
and-sres-a-simple-proposal.html [https://perma.cc/2RN2-TTEL]. 
53. Id. at 1–2, 4.  
54. For more detail on some examples, see Jonathan H. Adler, Rent Seeking 
Behind the Green Curtain, 4 Regulation 26 (1996), https://www.cato.org/ 
 sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1996/10/v19n4-4.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/CJM4-UKKZ]. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020 
The EPA at Fifty 
1092 
the EPA’s regulatory authorities, and bend the rules towards private 
gains. 
But is it fair to blame the EPA for this phenomenon? Not entirely. 
Often the Agency is acting in response to pressure from Congress or the 
White House, or even in response to mandates that result from 
litigation. In many cases, the bootlegger stories above played out more 
in the legislative arena than in the process of administrative rule-
making. And external political forces always will—indeed, they always 
must—play a role in shaping policy. 
Even so, the EPA must take some responsibility for letting its 
attention wander from its core mission. The program offices within the 
EPA are themselves interested parties, and actively engage in the 
rough-and-tumble of the politics that preoccupy the denizens of D.C. 
In my observation, the EPA’s offices will sometimes actively collaborate 
with bootleggers in an attempt to build political support for the 
expansion of one program or another. In the long run, I think the EPA 
will be more successful by resisting entanglement with bootleggers, and 
by keeping its environmental mission, and the public interest, 
paramount. 
